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THE COAST WATCHERS 
[By COMMANDER E. A. FELDT.] 
(Read before the Society on 26 October, 1961.) 
At the end of World War I the Australian Naval 
Board established a Coast Watching Organisation 
around the coast of Australia and in the adjacent 
Island Territories so that in war, suspicious sightings 
should be reported. It relied mainly on Customs 
Officers and they were supplied with a code and used 
land-line for reporting. However, much of the coast 
was left uncovered owing to the sparseness of popula-
tion in places and the distance between ports. 
To the north-east of Australia, there is a chain of 
islands which forms a screen covering the approach 
from that direction. In it were four different civil 
governments, Papua, Mandated New Guinea, the 
British Solomon Islands Protectorate and the Condo-
minium Government (with the French) of the New 
Hebrides. The areas were backward in development, 
there were no landline communications, not a railway 
anywhere and less than five hundred miles of traffic-
able road in the whole chain of islands. However, radio 
communication was well developed and there was con-
siderable air traffic in Mandated New Guinea. These 
Territories, with the northern part of Queensland, 
comprised the North East Area. In it, Townsville, 
Thursday Island, Port Moresby, Samarai, Madang, 
Rabaul, Tulagi and Vila held codes and reported, by 
radio except in the case of Townsville and Thursday 
Island. 
Shortly before the war with Germany, a small 
military force was stationed at Thursday Island and 
an Examination Service instituted. Another was estab-
lished at Port Moresby, manning two six inch guns, 
and on the outbreak, a Squadron of R.A.A.F. with two 
Empire Flying Boats and two smaller aircraft was 
moved there. An N.O.I.C. was appointed and an 
Examination Service brought into action. 
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War with Germany 
I had retired from the R.A.N, as a Lieutenant in 
1922, had joined the Administration of the Mandated 
Territory the next year, and had spent the interven-
ing years in that service, mainly as a District Officer 
and had served in most parts of the Territory. This 
gave me a knowledge of the area and a wide acquain-
tance with its people, European and native, plus ex-
perience of living in the jungle, so it was a natural 
appointment for me to become Staff Officer (Intelli-
gence) at Port Moresby. I was ordered to expand the 
Coast Watching Organisation in the area using volun-
teer civilians for the duties. 
There were several civil teleradio networks in the 
area and my first task was to tie all of these into the 
existing reporting centres. Playfair was used as a code 
and the operators taught how to use it and what to 
report. To do this meant visiting each one personally 
and the first few months were spent travelling around 
by Flying Boat, ship, small boat, bicycle and on foot, 
making these contacts. Everyone was most co-opera-
tive and willing and much assistance was given by the 
various Territory Administrations. 
However, these telei'adios were only fortuitously 
placed and some of the most likely approaches were 
not covered. D.N.I. (Commander Long, R.A.N.) 
agreed to supply teleradios for use by civilians at strat-
egic points. At Anir, the most important, a Yeoman 
of Signals was established in a camp overlooking the 
main approach. By the end of 1940, over 100 tele-
radios were included in the network stretching from 
Torres Straits along the Papuan and New Guinea 
coasts, through the Bismarcks, Solomons and New 
Hebrides. At the fall of France, Governor Sautot of 
the New Hebrides was the first to rally to de Gaulle 
and our organisation there remained unimpaired. 
At this stage of the war, raiders were the only 
possible enemy. Two raiders landed prisoners on 
Emirau Island, north of Kavieng and these were re-
ported in time to rescue them promptly but too late to 
take action against the raiders themselves. Not long 
afterwards, two raiders entered the Solomons Sea, 
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Boat on passage. They reversed course and did not 
enter the area again. 
In mid-1941, an Area Combined Headquarters was 
established at Townsville and I was appointed there 
as Supervising Intelligence Oflficer for the area. It had 
become apparent that Administration Officers of the 
various centres would, in the event of serious warfare, 
have too much of their own business to do to attend 
to ours so it was decided to appoint a Naval Intelli-
gence Officer to each Territory capital. By this time, 
the Army and R.A.A.F. forces in Port Moresby had 
been increased and a Battalion with two six inch guns 
had been installed in Rabaul, with Advanced Opera-
tional Bases at Rabaul and Tulagi for the R.A.A.F. 
In addition, the New Guinea Volunteer Rifles had been 
formed from local European volunteers, and there 
were small Commando detachments at Kavieng, 
Manus and Buka Passage. All these small detach-
ments would obviously, if we lost command of the sea, 
become easy prey for larger forces. 
The question of what should be done in the event 
of an invasion had been raised and while in Port 
Moresby I had arranged for a detachment of native 
police to accompany me to the jungle and continue re-
porting if hostile forces took the Port. It was laid 
down that this should be done by the N.I.O's in other 
ports, but no orders could be given to the civilian 
Coast Watchers who were told to bury their teleradios 
and escape. However, I had privately discussed the 
question with many of them and had told them their 
services might be of great value if they continued re-
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porting. The decision whether they did so or not was 
left to each individual. 
To "go bush" is not as simple as it sounds. Sup-
plies had to be taken and the teleradio, with its charg-
ing engine and petrol, moved over primitive tracks. 
This made carriers necessary, who eat, and so need 
more supplies. Local natives must be used as carriers 
and food supplies obtained from local villages for the 
carriers, so that the whereabouts of the party was 
known to many, any of whom could betray the party. 
The co-operation of the natives had to be obtained and 
this was a job for a specialist and not anyone could do 
that. First, he had to speak the local brand of pidgin, 
which is a separate language, and takes up to a year to 
learn. Conditions would be grossly unhealthy and only 
those who understood the climatic conditions could 
survive. This all added up to the limitation that only 
experienced "Islanders," (Europeans who had lived 
there) could be successful and these must be reason-
ably young. There never were many and a number had 
already gone away to the War. These Islanders were 
difficult people, individualists who thought for them-
selves and reacted to personal contact rather than 
general orders. Fortunately, I knew most of them and 
they knew me. 
The Japanese War — The Defensive 
The Japanese had been underestimated. Their 
fleet had approximate numerical equality with that of 
the U.S.A. and they had developed an efficiency in sea-
air operations which was the highest in the world. 
They had the best fighter aircraft and the best tor-
pedo. Though lagging in radar, their night-fighting 
was highly competent, and in Yamamoto, who revolu-
tionised sea warfare, the world's best Admiral 
(though he was soon to be surpassed). Later, weak-
nesses were to show up, but after Pearl Harbour the 
Japanese had complete command of the sea. Their 
progress in the Philippines and Malaya apprised us 
that our turn would not be long in coming. But we had 
time to evacuate the European women and children 
from the Territories. 
Soon afterwards, aircraft from Truk reconnoitred 
the New Guinea area, and the first bombs were 
dropped on Rabaul on 4 Januarv, 1942. These aircraft 
were reported by Page on Tabar, giving warning 
which was largely wasted, as there were only Wirra-
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ways at Rabaul which were too slow to intercept the 
Japanese bombers. There were further light raids and 
on the 20 January, Rabaul was bombed by dive-
bombers accompanied by Zeros, This raid put the guns 
out of action and it was apparent that a carrier-
supported landing was imminent. But next day the 
Japanese swept over Kavieng, Salamaua and Lae 
which were all severely bombed. On the morning of 
22 January, the Japanese landed at Rabaul, driving 
the garrison into the hinterland. Gasmata on the south 
coast of New Britain was taken next day and Anir and 
Nissen went off the air, silenced by landing parties. 
No news came from Rabaul at all. 
Assistant District Oflficer McCarthy at Talasea, on 
the north coast of New Britain, was asked to find out 
what had happened. He travelled eastwards until he 
met parties of the garrison, sent to the south coast to 
contact others there and organised an evacuation 
westwards along the north coast. Boats were des-
patched from New Guinea mainland to contact him 
and ferry his party over to New Guinea, but he located 
a small ship at Witu. He ferried over to her, took 
charge of her, put his refugees on board and sailed 
through Vitiaz Straits with over 200. Three planters 
who had assisted him elected to stay on New Britain 
and continue reporting, while the New Guinea main-
land parties under Patrol Oflficer 'Blue' Harris returned 
to the coast south-east of Madang. 
There were still further remnants of the garrison 
of Rabaul on the south coast of New Britain, in-
cluding the N.I.O. from Rabaul (Lieut. Mackenzie, 
R.A.N.). Lieut. Timperley, of the Army (formerly a 
Papuan Administration Officer) took a motor boat 
there on a night run from the Trobriands, and re-
ported all clear. Then the former Papuan Government 
vacht "Laurabada" under Lieut. Ivan Champion, 
R.A.N.V.R. (another former officer of the Papuan 
Administration) slipped across and brought off most 
of the remainder. 
Enemy Occupies Kavieng and Manus 
Kavieng had been evacuated by the small Army 
force there and was occupied soon afterwards, the 
force being later captured after suffering casualties. 
Manus was also occupied but the force there slipped 
away to safety. Page on Tabar and Kyle and Benham 
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near Namatanai continued reporting while two others 
from outlying islands made their way to Madang and 
joined Harris nearby, where I kept them for further 
use. They were soon joined by the three from New 
Britain who had found that area untenable. 
By this time, civil administration in Papua and 
New Guinea had ceased and the remaining personnel, 
where fit, had been formed into the Australian New 
Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU). Some of the 
coast watchers were taken into it but continued their 
duties and remained under my command. 
Among those who escaped from Rabaul just 
before it fell was Assistant District Oflficer Leigh Vial. 
He came to me in Townsville and asked for a job. I 
wanted him urgently as he had a good local knowledge 
of Salamaua and the confidence of the natives nearby. 
Salamaua was obviously the next target for the Jap-
anese. It was impossible to take him into the Navy 
but an R.A.A.F. oflficer took the responsibility of 
making him a Pilot Officer on the spot. He was hastily 
equipped and flown in to Salamaua just before the 
Nips got there. He hid in the bush on a nearby ridge 
overlooking the airfield and for months reported all 
Japanese air movements, giving warning to Port 
Moresby of raids which enabled the Kittyhawks there 
to be in the air to meet them. Raids from Rabaul were 
reported by Grahamslaw at Buna, while another party 
twenty miles out from Port Moresby gave final warn-
ing. Warnings of raids on Thursday Island were given 
by stations on the south coast of Papua. 
At Buka Passage, Assistant District Oflficer Read 
made a depot of stores inland on Bougainville, ready 
to go bush when the Japs arrived. The detachment of 
Commandos was placed under his command and Paul 
Mason, a planter, also decided to stay. In March, the 
enemy occupied Buka Passage and Buin on the south-
ern end of Bougainville and Mason was sent to watch 
the latter. Soon afterwards, the Japs heard he was 
there and brought in a pack of dogs to hunt him but, 
very luckily, the dogs were killed by a bomb from one 
of our infrequent Catalina raids. In the Solomons, Mr. 
W. M. Marchant, the Resident Commissioner, moved 
to Malaita where he continued administration as best 
he could. Lieut. Macfarlan, R.A.N.V.R., the N.LO. in 
the Solomons, was sent to Guadalcanal where two ex-
perienced civilians joined him, and where there were 
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already two other Coast Watchers, while Kennedy, a 
District Officer, moved around and finally selected Segi 
on the strait between New Georgia and Vangunu as 
his base. 
Code Name 'Ferdinand' 
About this time General MacArthur took com-
mand of the S.W. Pacific Area and it was decided to 
create the Allied Intelligence Bureau which would 
command and integrate all Intelligence Organisations 
of an unconventional nature. Colonel Roberts of the 
Australian Army was placed in charge directly under 
G2 (General Willoughby) and the Coast Watchers 
became a section of A.LB. A code name for the organ-
isation was required and I chose 'Ferdinand' as, like 
the bull, it was not our role to fight but to sit under 
a tree and send signals. East of Long. 160 degrees 
was the South Pacific Area, under CINCPAC (Admiral 
Nimitz) and part of the Coast Watching Organisation 
was in it, but this never became a difficulty as we re-
ceived complete support and co-operation from the 
U.S. Forces in both Areas. At this time, too, all re-
maining civilian Coast Watchers were given rank in 
the R.A.N. 
A sighting of ships near Ysabel Island by an 
agent of Kennedy's sparked off the Battle of the Coral 
Sea. Schroeder, on Savo Island, saw the occupation of 
Tulagi by the Japanese and the subsequent attack on 
their ships by American aircraft. Though the sub-
sequent carrier action prevented the Japanese from 
attacking (and almost certainly taking) Port Moresby, 
it did not prevent them from building up strength. 
They enlarged the airfields at Buka Passage (reported 
by Read) and Buin (reported by Mason) and commen-
ced an airfield on Guadalcanal (reported by Macfarlan 
and Rhodes). Page, Kyle and Benham went off the air; 
they were captured and later killed, as we subse-
quently learnt. 
Far off, a month after Coral Sea came the Battle 
of Midway. Midway was the decisive action of the 
Pacific War, a Japanese defeat brought about by weak-
nesses in their codes. The loss of four carriers took 
the command of the sea away from the Japanese but 
did not give it to the Americans; it was still in the 
balance and still to be won. But the Japanese could no 
longer go where they willed as they had in the first 
half of 1942. 
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Operations in the Balance of Power Period 
The Japanese were still intent on expanding and 
their next move was an attack on Milne Bay and a 
landing at Buna in an attempt to take Port Moresby, 
The importance of Milne Bay had been realised and 
there was a force of over two Brigades there which 
repulsed the attack summarily. However, the heart-
ening effect of the victory was soon lost as their 
jungle-trained troops pushed across the mountains 
from Buna. But the American attack on Guadalcanal 
was being prepared and took place in August, shortly 
afterwards. 
For this operation, Read and Mason were per-
fectly placed. Mason was on the direct line of flight 
from Rabaul to Guadalcanal and Read was on the line 
from Kavieng. Japanese air attacks were certain and 
were the greatest danger to the Guadalcanal convoy 
so special measures were taken to ensure that their 
warnings were received. American ships were given 
the frequencies on which to listen, and Read and 
Mason were ordered to report in plain language. In 
addition, a further circuit was prepared through Port 
Moresby to Canberra to Pearl Harbour which would 
broadcast the warnings to the U.S. Fleet. 
Tulagi and Guadalcanal were attacked at sunrise 
and opposition quickly overcome except on two small 
islands in Tulagi Harbour. Two Coast Watchers, 
Lieutenants R.A.N.V.R. Horton and Josselyn, both 
Solomon Island District Officers, accompanied the 
attack to supply local knowledge. In the forenoon. 
Mason reported torpedo-carrying aircraft on their 
way. This gave an hour and a half warning, in which 
carrier-borne aircraft could be readied, ships deployed, 
and all arrangements made for their reception. On 
board "Canberra" was piped: 'The ship will be at-
tacked by torpedo-carrying aircraft at noon; hands 
will go to dinner at 11.30,' The aircraft came in low 
from the eastward, over Florida Island but found the 
ships ready for them. They caused no damage and 
only one aircraft returned to its base. 
Next morning. Read reported a heavy flight of 
bombers on the way and this time fighters from the 
carriers met them, shooting down many and breaking 
up the attack. In the next four days, there were 
numerous attacks, only one of which got through un-
reported. Enemy aircraft casualties were so heavy 
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that there was a lull for a few days after that. But 
the Battle of Savo, in which "Canberra" and three 
heavy U.S. cruisers had been sunk in a night action, 
had hastened the departure of the convoy and the 
Marines ashore were deficient in many supplies. Even 
so, within a week the Seabees had completed the air-
field at Lunga, on Guadalcanal, and had established a 
perimeter around it and a few days later fighters and 
dive bombers were flown in. Mackenzie was despatched 
to Lunga as my Deputy to collect and disseminate 
intelligence sent in by the Coast Watchers and he soon 
afterwards took operational control of the Solomon 
Island chain, including Mason and Read, though the 
latter two remained under me for supplies. (It is 
interesting to note that Read and Mason were in the 
S.W, Paciflc Area and Guadalcanal in the South Pacific 
Area but this worried nobody). For the next four 
months, Guadalcanal hung on by a string, bombed by 
day and shelled by night, but the tough Mackenzie 
carried on through it all, in spite of his three months 
as a refugee from Rabaul not long before. 
The Holding of Guadalcanal 
The holding of Guadalcanal depended primarily on 
command of the air without which there could be no 
command of the sea. Fighter aircraft were the most 
important single factor, and the Japanese Zero was at 
that time the best fighter in the world. No other 
fighter could dog-fight with it, not even the Spitfire, 
as was confirmed later at Darwin. At Guadalcanal, the 
Americans had the Grumman, robust and well armed, 
but slower and less manoeuvrable than the Zero. (And 
there were not many of them). The only way the 
Grumman could win was by being above the Zero, 
diving on him and continuing the dive after firing if 
the Zero was not knocked out. The warnings of the 
Coast Watchers were therefore vital; they gave the 
Grumman time to fuel and climb and be above the 
Zeros when they arrived. 
To shorten the range, the Japanese based fighters 
on Buka Passage and Buin, Their take-off allowed 
Read and Mason to report them, even when the bomb-
ers they were escorting could not be seen. Many raids 
were reported by Kennedy as well, giving the time of 
attack with greater accuracy. Twice daily, Mason re-
ported the number of ships in harbour at Buin which 
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was invaluable. Code was being used again by this 
time. 
The Japs determined to retake Guadalcanal. 
Soldiers were landed by destroyers at night, running 
down 'The Slot,' as the passage between the islands 
was called. The destroyer runs were called the 'Tokyo 
Express.' Interception by U.S. surface forces had 
varying success but the Japanese built up their 
numbers to 20,000 and then prepared to make a major 
invasion in November. Read saw and reported the 
main convoy of twelve large merchant ships and 
Mason's reports of the smaller ships in Buin gave the 
pattern. Admiral Halsey's forces intercepted them, 
sinking two battleships in night actions, while air-
craft from Guadalcanal sank most of the transports. 
During all this time, the enemy had been search-
ing for Read and Mason. There were still many civil-
ians on Bougainville and Read asked for a submarine 
to take them off. This was done on New Year's Day, 
just after midnight, but all could not be collected in 
time and others were taken off later. Mason, in the 
meantime, had been hunted out of Buin and had made 
his way to Read through the mountainous interior, a 
walk of over a hundred miles. 
Supplies had been dropped from time to time by 
Catalina aircraft at night. The method was for the 
Coast Watcher to signal a spot which I knew, the 
E.T.A, of the aircraft would be signalled, fires lit 
around the area and the supplies dropped out. The 
recovery was surprisingly good but for a while the 
supply of parachutes was inadequate. 
Solomons Network Expanded 
In the Solomons, the network was expanded by 
landing pairs of Coast Watchers from a submarine on 
Vella Lavella and Choiseul, and others were inserted 
by boat on Rendova and Ysabel. These were to give 
later warnings of the Tokyo Express as well as of air-
craft. Horton on Rendova also overlooked Munda 
where the enemy was establishing a base. On Ysabel, 
Corrigan kept watch on a seaplane base. Before the 
New Year came in, Mackenzie had streamline Coast 
Watching in operation; ships or aircraft left Buin, 
were reported by either Josselyn and Keenan on Vella 
Lavella or Wadell and Seton on Choiseul; their further 
progress was reported by Kennedy or Horton and 
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their time of arrival calculated probably more 
accurately than the Japanese knew it themselves. 
At Segi, Kennedy was in control of the surround-
ing natives and realised that to keep it, he had to 
check Japanese patrols into the immediate area. There 
were several of these, but with his Native Police he 
ambushed them and successfully kept them out. His 
native spies reported that the Nipponese were building 
an airstrip on Munda and this was disbelieved as 
photographs showed no sign of it. But they were right. 
The Japanese were building it in a coconut plantation 
and had strung wires across to hold the tops of the 
palms in position while they worked underneath. By 
constant alertness and dour fighting, Kennedy held his 
position until a force of Marines was landed there pre-
paratory to the assault on Munda. 
From the beginning of the attack on Guadalcanal, 
airmen of both sides were being shot down. The Coast 
Watchers instructed the natives to lead in the 
Americans and to capture the Japanese, but the latter 
were dissident and the natives usually killed them. As 
the war progressed, more and more airmen were being 
rescued by Coast Watchers and the knowledge that 
they could expect help if shot down was a considerable 
morale builder to the U,S, Forces. Crews from sunken 
ships were also rescued; later, Josselyn and Firth on 
Vella Lavella had one hundred and sixty survivors of 
U.S.S. "Helena" on their hands when she was sunk 
nearby. These were picked up by a destroyer and re-
turned to Guadalcanal, 
In mid-1942, Page, Kyle and Benham had gone off 
the air. It was almost certain that Page had been 
captured but there was a possibility that Kyle and 
Benham were in the jungle and also that Woodroffe on 
Anir was also free. Pilot Oflficer Cecil Mason, a man 
with Island experience, was sent in by submarine to 
attempt a rescue. He landed on southern New Ireland 
and found that Kyle and Benham had been captured, 
then landed on Anir, By bad luck, a patrol craft forced 
the submarine to dive. While waiting for the return of 
the submarine, he and Woodroffe were captured. They 
were executed later, murdered rather, as they were in 
uniform. 
Enemy Thrust From Buna Frustrated 
In Papua, the enemy thrust from Buna had been 
driven back across the ranges and confined to a strip 
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of coast in the Buna-Gona area, where they were 
resisting to the last man, literally. To overcome them, 
sea transport was necessary but there were no charts 
of the area beyond an outline of the coast and grave 
warnings of numerous coral reefs, a situation hard to 
understand in a civilized country. There was a deep 
water channel along the coast, with reefs outside it, 
and one bad reef right in the way, known to locals. The 
R.A.N, sent survey ships but their work would take 
time and it was desired to get small ships through at 
once. The run had to be made at night to avoid air 
attacks. Ferdinand undertook the task, using a 
seventy-foot motor boat under the command of Ivan 
Champion to fix the position of the reef, buoy it and 
put a light on it at night when required. Champion 
piloted the ships through while the motor boat atten-
ded to the light and picked him up as necessary. The 
mixed nature of the personnel of 'Ferdinand' is shown 
by the composition of this par ty; one Lieut. 
R.A.N.V.R., four Army Oflficers, two R.A.A.F. Oflficers, 
six Commando Other Ranks and one U.S. Army Officer 
who went for the ride. The ships got through and some 
g'ot back, and by the end of 1942 there were charts 
which made this service unnecessary. 
While the Japanese were being eliminated at 
Buna, there was a danger that they might send 
further forces down the coast from Lae to take the 
attackers in rear and in particular, to destroy the air-
fields on which they depended. Two parties, under 
Noakes and Bridges, were keeping watch on the coast 
between Lae and Buna and they found that barges 
were travelling down at night and hiding by day in the 
mangrove creeks. Noakes was so successful in locating 
hidden barges and his information so accurate that 
aircraft attacks on them broke up the service and the 
threat never developed. 
Parties on the mainland, S.E. of Madang, were 
re-organised and supplied by drop. Five parties, each 
with a motor boat, were despatched to New Britain 
but the enemy moved in at the same time, the worst 
situation that could arise. Two parties were wiped out 
but the other three successfully withdrew to the main-
land. As these men had been behind the lines for about 
a year, I decided to relieve them and a party with a 
radio technician attached was sent in. To get there, 
they had to be flown to Bona Bena, an inland airfield, 
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cross the Markham valley, now being patrolled by the 
enemy and climb over the Finisterre Range, about 
6,000 feet high. They got there but Bell (who had been 
on New Britain with McCarthy) and Laws (the radio 
technician) were murdered by treacherous natives on 
their return journey. Enemy patrols attacked the re-
lieving party and it had to be withdrawn but three of 
the originals, Pursehouse, McColl and Freund, in the 
mountains overlooking Finschafen, kept free and re-
mained until the area was re-taken. 
Three other parties, one Dutch, were sent to the 
Sepik Area, One, under Ashton, trying to operate 
close to Wewak, was soon driven out, but the other, 
under Fryer, remained further inland and carried on. 
The Dutch party, trying to cross into Dutch New 
Guinea, was captured and killed. 
About this time (end of 1942) a much lighter 
teleradio came into service, run on dry batteries and 
so needing no charging engine. The personnel, too, had 
been expanding as more men who had experience in 
New Guinea and the Solomons were collected. 
Allies Take the Offensive 
Early in 1943, the balance of power was swinging 
our way. The enemy had been eliminated in the Buna-
Gona area; he had evacuated the remnants of his force 
from Guadalcanal and his air power had deteriorated. 
His position was really worse than was realised as the 
attrition of his air forces had not been made good 
while new American carriers were coming into com-
mission. His losses in merchant shipping to the U.S. 
submarines were limiting his ability to move forces; 
in fact, his position was much as ours had been a year 
earlier except that he had large forces dug in around 
his perimeter. But demands of other theatres of war 
had prevented the Pacific Forces from reaching a 
readiness to attack immediately, and the offensive was 
fixed for June, 1943, On that date, the South Pacific 
Forces would attack Munda and the S.W. Pacific 
Forces would be moved forward preparatory to an 
attack on Salamaua, Lae, and Finschafen. 
'Ferdinand's' part was to accompany the attack-
ing forces in the Solomons as guides and to provide 
warnings of sea and air counter-attacks. In New 
Guinea, the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, in which most 
of a convoy to Lae was destroyed by air attacks, had 
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cut off most surface supplies to that port, but sub-
marines were being used to transport supplies to it 
from Rabaul, A party under Lieut. Wright, 
R.A.N,V,R., was landed between Jacquinot and Wide 
Bays on New Britain to spot these as they passed on 
the surface and to report air attacks from Rabaul 
when the move against Lae was made. Later, more 
parties were landed at the western end of New Britain 
and near Finschafen to select landing sites just before 
the attacks were made on these places. 
On the administrative side, Headquarters were 
shifted to Brisbane where General MacArthur was 
located. A camp was selected outside Brisbane where 
Coast Watchers who had been behind the lines could 
recuperate and train. 
As the parties on Bougainville had been a year in 
the jungle, I decided to relieve them. Three experi-
enced officers, Robinson, Stevenson and Keenan (re-
lieved from Vella Lavella) were sent in by submarine 
with a section of Commandos to relieve those already 
there, and the opportunity was taken to bring out 
more civilians. But when the submarine returned it 
was found that Read and Mason were not on board. 
They had refused to leave; they were fit and refused 
to go while the natives who had been so loyal to them 
were left behind. 
In March, 1943, while on a visit to Guadalcanal, I 
suffci-ed a coronary thrombosis which ended my com-
mand of 'Ferdinand.' Mackenzie was brought out to 
relieve me but he developed blackwater fever and 
Commander McManus, R.A.N. (Rtd,) was appointed. 
It was a difficult assignment for him as he was not an 
Islander, but he soon gathered the scattered activities 
into his hands and his sterling character gained the 
respect of those difficult men, the Islanders. 
To open Munda to attack, Rendova was first 
taken, the landing party guided by Rhoades, who had 
been on Guadalcanal before it was re-taken. Retreat-
ing Japanese stumbled on to the Coast Watcher's post 
and the party had to withdraw under fire, but it was 
no longer needed then. Corrigan and Horton accom-
panied the attack on Munda, Corrigan at one stage 
acting as the sole signal unit for the force he was 
with, an unforeseen role. But Munda, due to be taken 
in a month, held out for three. The Japanese soldiers, 
told to hold on to the last man, did just that. 
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On Bougainville, enemy patrol activity had in-
creased. Trying to get to the southern end of the 
island. Mason's party was attacked and Stevenson 
killed, forcing the party to return. Read was also in 
trouble and had split his party up hoping for better 
concealment. One of these parties was attacked and 
wiped out and Read himself was attacked one night 
but escaped. It became impossible to obtain any in-
telligence and the only course was to withdraw the 
parties. This was done by submarine in July, 1943, 
Read ensuring by a subterfuge that the natives of 
other parts of the Territory who had stood by him so 
loyally would be taken off, too. Read and Mason had 
been in enemy-occupied territory for seventeen 
months. 
In the S.W, Pacific Area additional parties were 
landed on New Britain to supplement Wright's watch, 
forming a chain across the island to warn of air 
strikes. One party was discovered and attacked, ail 
being killed except the leader who was captured. The 
other parties evaded the searching patrols and not 
only were warnings given of air attacks but coastal 
shipping was reported and so disrupted by air attacks 
that the forces on the western end of New Britain 
could not be supplied. 
Guerilla Operations Instituted 
General MacArthur's Forces took Salamaua and 
Lae, then moving on to Finschafen and Cape 
Gloucester to open the sea route back to the 
Philippines. The Nipponese retreated, abandoning the 
western end of New Britain altogether. Their strag-
gling parties were a tempting target and there was 
now little intelligence to be sent so 'Ferdinand' prin-
ciples, designed for the defensive, needed amending. 
Arms were dropped to the parties, willing local natives 
trained in their use, and guerilla operations instituted. 
An outstanding leader was Sgt. Mjr. Simogun of the 
Native Police, who had landed with Wright. Over 
three hundred Japs were killed during this retreat. 
Further westward. Hall watched the evacuation of 
Rooke and Long Islands, reporting the enemy's move-
ments as they left. 
Towards the end of 1943, the Americans were 
ready to land on Bougainville so parties were inserted 
on the west coast to cover the attack. These watched 
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the tracks and reported enemy movements towards 
Torokina in which a base was soon established. 
Admiral Halsey pushed further ahead to Nissan and 
Emirau and the three new airfields dominated Rabaul 
where the Japanese were unable to maintain aircraft 
any longer. Soon afterwards. General MacArthur took 
Manus, completing the cutting off of Rabaul where 
80,000 Japs 'withered on the vine.' 
A party had been prepared for Manus but its use 
was not necessary. It was landed at Hollandia, the next 
objective, but the party was attacked soon after land-
ing and its leader, 'Blue' Harris and two men killed. 
The others escaped to the jungle and some survived 
until the landing a month later. 
Aitape was taken at the same time as Hollandia 
and soon afterwards parties were infiltrated into the 
Sepik area, to watch the movements of the Japanese 
inland. Parties in New Britain were strengthened and 
more parties sent to Bougainville. A battalion of 
Papuan Infantry was allotted to the Coast Watchers 
who were now guerillas rather than Intelligence Units. 
In New Britain, the enemy was confined to the eastern 
end of the island and any reconnaissance parties sent 
out of it were ambushed and generally wiped out. In 
Bougainville, the parties worked inland as most of the 
coast was strongly held by the Japanese, but the 
killing of the enemy went steadily on. On one occasion, 
Sandford attacked a detachment of Japs while they 
were doing calisthenics. On another, he found a party 
building shelters for the night; he got between them 
and their stacked arms, killing 195. But even so, Paul 
Mason, back in his old area, had the highest score. One 
sad casualty on Bougainville was Sgt. Mjr. Yauwicka, 
who lost a hand and both eyes in an accidental ex-
plosion. He had been Read's senior N.C.O. during all 
the long months of his period on Bougainville and was 
an outstanding leader. However, a corneal graft saved 
the sight of one eye and he still lives near Wewak, an 
honoured figure to both European and Native. 
The guerilla fighting continued until the end of 
the war. 
A summary of the activities, as far as records 
show, is that the Coast Watching parties killed 5,414, 
wounded 1,492 and captured 74 of the enemy. Our own 
losses were 37 Europeans killed, 2 captured and sur-
vived, 20 natives killed and 40 captured. We rescued 
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75 P.O.W, (Indians who had been brought from Singa-
pore), 321 shot down airmen, 280 naval personnel from 
sunken ships, 190 civilians, including missionaries 
who had been left behind when the Japanese over-ran 
the area, 260 Asiatics and an uncounted number of 
native refugees. But our main contribution was in In-
telligence. The decline of the Japanese power in the 
Pacific was in its air power, brought about by the 
attrition in the fighting in 1942 and 1943 and in this 
the warnings of the Coast Watchers played a vital 
part. As Admiral Halsey said: 'The Coast Watchers 
saved Guadalcanal and Guadalcanal saved the South 
Pacific' 
